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Qualia Logic
Let p be a statement of classical propositional calculus. We want to add cases for which p is a statement
about qualia. Classically, if p is a statement it can have truth values T or F. But if p contains qualia it 
contains ineffable information. One way to allow for this is to let p take on the truth values (T), (F), (T, 
i) or (F, i) for 'true', 'false', 'true and ineffable' or 'false and ineffable' [2]. For example I would give the 
sentence 
'one way that green appears to me is ██' 
the truth-value (T, i). 
If p is true and q is true then p˄q is true. Some reflection shows that if p is true and q is true and 
ineffable, then the proposition p˄q is ineffable... One can go through the truth value alternatives for 
p˄q systematically and construct a truth table for p˄q: 
Truth Table (matrix) for p˄q
q (T) (F) (T, i) (F, i)
p
(T) (T) (F) (T, i) (F, i)
(F) (F) (F) (F, i) (F, i)
(T, i) (T, i) (F, i) (T, i) (F, i)
(F, i) (F, i) (F, i) (F, i) (F, i)
If p has truth value (T, i), then ¬p could have either truth value (F, i) or (F). The first case happens 
when, for example, I assert that I'm seeing green when I'm really seeing purple. The second happens if 
I'm a zombie. In that case I would not be experiencing color at all, so ¬p gets the value (F).  
A first attempt at a truth table for p˅q is
q (T) (F) (T, i) (F, i)
p
(T) (T) (T) (T, i) (T)
(F) (T) (F) (T, i) (F, i)
(T, i) (T, i) (T, i) (T, i) (T, i)
(F, i) (T) (F, i) (T, i) (F, i)
Apparently truth tables could be given for other operators too. These give a 4-valued logic that one 
might call Qualia Logic (QL). Notice in the above tables the and-over-or distributive law fails.
A first guess at a truth table for p->q is
q (T) (F) (T, i) (F, i)
p
(T) (T) (F) (F) (T)
(F) (T) (T) (F, i) (F, i)
(T, i) (F) (F) (T, i) (F, i)
(F, i) (F, i) (F, i) (T, i) (T, i)
Notice that if p is going to answer the Hard Problem(s) (how and why qualia?), it must imply some 
proposition q that has a truth value (T, i). But in the (tentative) truth table above, this is not possible if p
has truth value (T). Therefore the truth value of p must be (T, i). Therefore the answer to the Hard 
Problem will itself be constituted at least partially by ineffable qualia. 
Questions: What's the difference in the logic (metaphysical or epistemic) of a zombie and the logic of 
those of us who do experience (or have) qualia? (I suppose a zombie cannot assign a truth value (T, i) 
metaphysically...) If we consider our experiences related to time as the 'input' qualia, can we apply QL 
and derive a temporal logic? Can QL be construed as an enlargement of the scope of the logic of 
physical laws?
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